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I Introduction 
How are we to define orthodoxy in the postmodern context? This is not 
only a theological but an ecclesial and socio-cultural question. Orthodoxy 
involves a claim to truth and ways of standing up for this truth in response 
to the challenges faced by that claim. In this article I discuss the Christian 
truth claim and its relation to our current context. This also means 
discussing different approaches to understanding this claim to truth in 
relation to various ways of analyzing the context. 
Here I can consider only a few aspects of this subject. 1 I shall try to 
show, from a socio-cultural and philosophical viewpoint, how the often 
self-evident truth claim involved in the Christian use of the notion of 
orthodoxy is affected (or 'interrupted') by a postmodern context. I shall 
refer primarily to the Western-European context, although globalization and 
worldwide communication mean that several aspects under examination 
recur in other contexts. I also give a summary account of three ways of 
dealing with the challenge to orthodoxy. 
ll The postmodern context 
From a socio-cultural perspective, the postmodern context in Western 
countries is marked, as far as religion is concerned, by secularization 
or detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization, which have 
changed the religious panorama dramatically over the years.2 Until the 
mid-twentieth century, Christian religious affiliation and identity were 
almost self-evident in large parts of Europe. This is no longer the case. 
Structurally speaking, religious identity and affiliation have become much 
more reflexive than before, and people are now much more inclined to 
choose their identities, and the way in which they live their affiliations. 
A pluralization of religions has also occurred through migration, and as 
a result of worldwide communication; it is more visible than in the past. 
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These influences make the European context significantly post-Christian 
and post-secular. As with several words with the prefix 'post', this does 
not imply that this context is no longer marked by Christianity, or by 
secularization, but it does indicate that the attitude of people and society 
to these realities has changed significantly. Secularization, for example, 
has not eradicated religion. Some commentators would even argue 
that desecularization is a feature of our times, but add that, in Europe 
at least, there has been an immense change in the situation of religious 
institutional affiliations and identity construction.3 Together with religious 
detraditionalization and individualization, religious pluralization has 
altered the position of religious believers and communities. Accordingly, 
religious identity and affiliation are no longer self-evident, but always 
involve a choice, at least on the structural level, which means that 
(from a biographical perspective) this choice can be experienced as a 
vocation. 
The need to choose, and the recurrent question why we should choose 
this rather than that, result in greater potential freedom and reflexivity. 
The new situation also makes identity unstable, because things could have 
been very different, and may be different now or in the future. We have 
become increa,singly aware that identity is always somewhat contingent, 
in the sense of depending on situations, available options, and peer, 
market and media influences. It is never acquired as such, to be owned 
by the onewhom it constitutes. Detraditionalization, individualization 
and pluralization result in a profound insecurity about identity. The new 
situation changes the task of identity construction for individuals and 
communities alike. Everyone in the relevant context has to cope with this 
task. This includes Christians and their churches. 
I would say that, from a socio-cultural perspective, the self-evident 
mode of individual and communal Christian identity construction is 
'interrupted'. The Christian faith is no longer acquired and transmitted 
without question but has to face structural insecurity. How are we to 
deal with these new possibilities of freedom and reflexivity, and with the 
accompanying instability and insecurity? Does this new situation offer 
new opportunities to appropriate the Christian tradition and its truth 
claim? Or is it adverse to the truth claim and transmission of the Christian 
tradition, because it makes identity construction problematical by offering 
choices beyond the traditional options? 
In certain philosophical circles, the postmodern context has been 
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marked by the criticism of metaphysics, of 'ontotheology', and of the 
'grand narratives' (or 'metanarratives ') of modernity. In the wake of 
Heidegger's critique of ontotheology4, proponents of 'difference' such 
as Derrida and Lyotard criticized any attempt to offer all-encompassing 
theories of being and of history. Derrida considered any such attempt to be 
guilty of metaphysical violence because it was oblivious to the 'difference/ 
dif.ferance', the 'margin' and the other, which was both constitutive of 
our ways of dealing with being, yet escaped our attempts to cope with 
it.5 Similarly, for Lyotard, postmodern criticism was directed against the 
modern (and postmodern) grand narratives and their indifference to the 
'differend', the event, the expectation, the opening and the otherness, 
which allowed us to think, to write and to speak, but could never be grasped 
by such expressions. He saw the task of a postmodern philosopher, writer 
and artist as searching for ways of thinking, writing, or expressing what 
was at stake in the event, without laying claim to it: that is, searching for 
ways to bear witness to the 'differend'. 6 
Over recent decades there has been some evidence of a turn to religion 
among proponents of' difference' in the phenomenological, hermeneutical 
and deconstructionist traditions. More specifically, religion seems to 
provide categories or Str\ltegies which are thought to be important for 
thinking and talking about what is beyond thinking and talking. 7 Of 
course, religion and religious language have been used prll:narily for 
strictly philosophical purposes, as offering ways to bear witness to that 
which is constitutive oflanguage, but always remains 'before' or 'beyond' 
language (as, for instance, in Lyotard's work). Some practitioners of the 
theory of 'difference' considered any such endeavour to be co-terminous 
with the unfolding of the structure of religion itself(Derrida, J.-L. Marion, 
E. Levinas ), and eventually this persuaded some of them to develop a kind 
of philosophical religiosity (J. Caputo, R. Kearney). In almost all these 
philosophical appeals to religion, language appeared as a contamination 
to be overcome in order to reach, or to hint at, a more original structure of 
religion ('religion without religion'). The narratives, doctrines, practices 
and institutions of religious traditions determined, domesticated and thus 
tended to ·obscure what was really at stake in the 'religious': the radical 
opening to the 'differend', to otherness, and to the event. Language was 
not considered as a mediating space that made religious relationships 
to the transcendent possible. On the contrary, language was regarded in 
terms of its radical failure to deal appropriately with the transcendent. 
84 
Orthodoxy in the Postmodern Context 
Philosophical discussions in this regard have focused on the question 
whether our attempts to go beyond language are ultimately futile (since 
we cannot escape language). The assumption that language contaminates 
inclined many proponents of 'difference' to develop their arguments 
in the form of a (philosophical) negative theology. They often did this 
with reference to Christian negative theologies, from which they either 
differentiated their own thought (Derrida, Lyotard), or which they claimed 
to exemplify more extensively, or fully (Marion, Levinas). Moreover, 
authors who have defined their approach to being Christian, or at least 
have developed it in conversation with the Christian tradition, have either 
drawn very selectively on a Christianity without incarnation (Caputo, 
Kearney), or have treated the Christian narrative as incurably hegemonic 
(Lyotard, Derrida). They may be said to have thought of real or pure 
religion as going beyond religion(s). 
How are we to deal with such redefinitions of religion and the ensuing 
criticisms of the Christian religion, which affect the latter's essential 
truth claims, and thus radically 'interrupt' Christian self-understanding? 
Here again, the question is whether these philosophical approaches can 
contribute to a current understanding of orthodoxy, understood as the 
way in which Christians consider and make the Christian truth claim 
operational. Or are they to be seen as radically opposed to the notion of 
orthodoxy? 
ill Three theological responses 
From a socio-cultural perspective, especially in consideratioin of the 
insecure nature of religious identity, there are challenges to the notion 
of orthodoxy today. It begs the question of how we can be sure about 
the truth which we (pro )claim. Certain philosephical critiques of religion 
and Christianity challenge the particularity of the truth claim involved in 
Christian orthodoxy, and call on us to look for the truth beyond its all-too-
determining and domesticating particularity. In the following, I shall try to 
distinguish between three different reactions to these two 'interruptions' of 
the Christian truth claim. The .first opposes these 'interruptions'; the second 
is characterized by an indiscriminate acceptance ofthese 'interruptions'; 
while the third reaction may be seen as opening itself to, yet challenging, 
some of their presumptions or consequences. 
Suspicion is an initial reaction to the structural insecurity of religious 
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identity, and to philosophical criticism of the all too particular nature 
of Christian truth claims. This suspicion is largely a response to the 
Western postmodem condition characterized by a culture of secularism 
and pluralism, nihilism and relativism. This theological reaction sees 
the postmodem criticism of modernity as helpful only in revealing 
the false presumptions of the modem projects of auto-sufficiency and 
emancipation. Only a firm reaffirmation of the Christian truth claim, and 
its particular rationality and practices, directed against this culture, can 
banish that insecurity and offer a way out of the nihilism and relativism 
which beset the Western context because it is oblivious to its Christian 
roots. Here orthodoxy functions as the true counter-narrative. This 
position has been promoted most prominently by 'Radical Orthodoxy', a 
movement which appeared at the very end of the twentieth century, and 
which aims at 'theologically reclaiming the world again'. It maintains that 
the integrity of reality and the reality of truth can be ensured only from 
an exclusively theological perspective. 8 In Roman Catholic circles, the 
theology of Joseph Ratzinger from 2005 till20 13 had similar features. He 
vehemently criticized the widespread secularism, nihilism and relativism 
of the current context, which he saw as typical of radical enlightenment 
culture, and in contradistinction to the culture of Christian faith. 9 As in 
Radical Orthodoxy, Ratzinger has generally promoted a somewhat neo-
Augustinian understanding of the relation between theological truth and 
context, which results in a profoundly dual understanding of reality. The 
relationship between the eternal and the temporal, the heavenly and the 
worldly, the Church and the world, is considered to be hierarchical and 
asymmetrical, and must be strictly differentiated, without confusion. 10 
Orthodoxy is the remedy against the failures of the context. 
This call for (radical) orthodoxy is framed in opposition to a context 
considered to be inimical to the Christian truth claim. The methodological 
starting-point is the discontinuity between Christian faith and the 
postmodem context. This implies that a theological dialogue with the 
world does not contribute intrinsically to our understanding of the 
Christian faith. Dialogue of this kind can serve only as an occasion for 
reaffirming its claims, and thus constitutes an instance of orthodoxy. 
By calling the world to conversion, this orthodoxy, and the Church that 
proclaims it, should be beacons of light and truth in a world that is going 
astray. Consequently, there are hardly any points of contact between faith 
and context, and the legitimacy of the Christian truth claim resides solely 
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in the Christian narrative, and in its tradition, Church and·magisterium. 
The claims of truth and authority go hand-in-hand. Symbolic identity 
markers (such as language, structures, practices, rules and so· on) are 
largely seen as distinguishing Church from world, and are thus held to 
be of the utmost importance. Within the Church, this understanding of 
orthodoxy is threatened by internal division and dissent (often said to 
be induced through infection by the world), which should therefore be 
prevented or contained. 11 
The second theological response has its starting-point in continuity 
with the postmodem context. From a socio-cultural and a philosophical 
perspective, the particularity of the Christian narrative and its claim to 
truth seems to prevent access to religious truth, rather than mediating or 
facilitating it. The insecurity brought about by socio-cultural processes 
affects identity construction, and motivates a suspicion about deep 
involvement in a specific narrative. The philosophical deconstruction of 
the Christian truth claim in terms of a more fundamental religious desire, 
disposition, or relationship induces suspicion of sincere commitment in 
the .Christian tradition. In both cases, the postmodem context does not 
favour taking Christian truth claims, narratives and practices too seriously, 
because the latter seem to limit and even to obfuscate what religion is 
really about. The first theological response, of course, re-inforces such a 
viewpoint, as it profiles Christian orthodoxy as a counter-cultural narrative 
by strengthening its very particularity. 
From a socio-cultural perspective, coping with the assignment of 
religious identity construction (and its insecurity) in continuity with the 
context has resulted in the development of a broad, vague religiosity, 
or search for spirituality, that does away with certain specific Christian 
beliefs, and is open to alternative expressions. In the foregoing, I referred 
to this religious phenomenon as 'something-ism': the expression of a 
religious longing that 'there is something more' to life than whatever is 
maintained by scientific and pragmatic world-views, with a simultaneous 
inability or unwillingness to say anything else about what this 'more' 
might be about. 12 In philosophical circles, thinkers such as Caputo and 
Kearney (and, in his own way, G. Vattimo) have deconstructed Christian 
faith claims in order to safeguard the radical nature of religious desire, of 
'pure religion'. Here, the 'messianic' must always be distinguished from 
particular messianisms. In this regard, Christianity's-Ghristological claims 
are always too confessionally partisan. For both, the very 'narrativity' 
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of the Christian faith, and the specificity of its truth claims (that is, its 
particular orthodoxy), hinder an authentic religious disposition. The new 
orthodoxy they seek goes beyond Christian particularity. 
The third and final theological reaction is a response which seeks 
primarily to deal in a critical-constructive way with the challenge of 
the contextual 'interruptions' of Christian truth claims (both involving 
continuity and discontinuity), while adding a corrective to the two former 
reactions. 
The socio-cultural contextual 'interruption' of the self-evident nature 
of Christian identity construction (including its truth claims) challenges 
certain presumptions, such as the general plausibility and generic 
legitimacy of Christian faith. In the present plural religious cqntext 
in the West,· Christian faith has become one option among many, and 
being a Christian is, structurally speaking, a choice. Accordingly, when 
confronted with its truth claim, Christians who do not take into account 
the freedom and reflexivity involved in this process (freely choosing and 
being able to reflect about and argue for the choice made), act counter-
productively. In this regard, the context 'interrupts' not only the classical/ 
self-evident view of orthodoxy, but its more recent counter-cultural 
perspective. The insecurity involved in identity construction should not 
prevent any such construction, resulting in nihilism or relativism (because 
not choosing is also a choice). It should be clear, however, that Christian 
faith entails a conscious involvement that requires initiation into the 
particularity of its tradition, narratives, doctrines and practices. It is not by 
denying or suppressing the insecurity of the prQcess that Christian identity 
construction copes with it effectively. On the contrary, it does so by 
fostering a reflexive appropriation of Christian faith. That appropriation is 
aware of the particular nature of choosing, and the fact that it is not self-
evident, and is not paralyzed by the process. All this gives rise to a self-
critical impetus that does not allow for overly confident and unquestioned 
truth claims. Christian faith is never acquired as such, but must always be 
re-appropriated. Orthodoxy is not an automatic possession but has to be 
continuously re-engaged with. The socio-cultural 'interruption' of Christian 
truth claims instigates a sincere reflexive engagement of Christian tradition, 
and 'interrupts' the paralyzing effects of the ensuing insecurity (relativism 
banishing all truth), as well as counter-cultural theological responses to it 
(claiming truth and security against the context). Being a Christian means 
definitely opting for a specific tradition (against something-ism), but not 
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closing oneself off, and within the borders of that tradition (against the 
counter-cultural reaction). Continuity and discontinuity between faith and 
context are combined here. Orthodoxy is not a closed set of doctrines and 
practices, to be held to or withdrawn from, but involves opening ourselves 
to the truth of a tradition and its identity-constructing capacity, without 
absolutizing or encompassing that truth. 
Discussion of the philosophical 'interruption' of Christian truth 
claims may help to clarify this last statement. The claim that language 
contaminates a more original religious structure, and should be set aside 
in order to contemplate religious desire or engage in a relationship with 
what is beyond language, challenges Christian orthodoxy to think about 
the nature of its particularity (narratives, doctrine and practices). Surely, 
from this perspective, particular truth claims that are held as absolute or 
are already in possession, and that isolate themselves from the challenge 
of 'interruption', are a hindrance to more adequate ways of dealing with 
religious truth. From a theological perspective, however, it is questionable 
whether language is to be understood solely as contamination. Within a 
dynamics of incarnation, it is possible to argue that particularity, history 
and language are not impediments to religious truth, but the ways in which 
it is mediated to us and we deal with it in faith. Language is not to be 
considered primarily as contamination but as the condition of religious 
truth. The quest for religious truth. does not lead 'beyond', let alone 
'behind', lffilguage, but to language itself. It guides us to the specific 
stories, practices, texts and traditions in which religious truth is lived and 
experienced. Only there can we find the ground and content of religious 
truth claims. In Christianity, this insight is radicalized through the concepts 
ofkenosis and incarnation, and ultimately in the preferential option for the 
poor and the marginalized. God reveals Godself not only in actual histories 
and narratives but especially in histories and narratives of suffering, and 
the dangerous memory of suffering, cross and resurrection are at the heart 
of a Christian hermeneutics. In this latter perspective, language as such 
is not the problem, but a failure to heed the one who is not allowed to 
speak. 
Christian negative theology does not lead to an evacuation oflanguage, 
meaning and content but bears witness to their saturation. In a Christian 
theological perspective, we do not have to choose between narrative and 
particularity, or openness and the beyond of lan~age. An open Christian 
narrative is the way to deal with theological truth, without mastering 
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or dismissing it. 13 Here again the contextual 'interruption' of theology 
is accompanied by a theological 'interruption' of the (philosophical) 
context. 
IV Conclusion: orthodoxy and Christian truth-claims· 
Orthodoxy concerns the question of how to understand the Christian truth 
claim adequately in relation to the current, 'postmodem' context. I have 
argued that a critical-constructive response to the structural insecurity 
of Christian identity construction, and to the philosophical criticism of 
the particularity of Christian truth claims, is preferable to responses that 
favour either strict opposition and discontinuity, or mere adaptation and 
continuity. Critically engaging with the socio-cultural and philosophical 
'interruption' of orthodoxy qualifies the truth claims which it proposes, 
and simultaneously 'interrupts' the unquestioned presumptions or 
consequences of these contextual 'interruptions'. Christian truth claims 
are not only 'interrupted' but 'interrupt'. 
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